Article IV, Part Third, Section 14 of the maine State Constitution

Article IV, Part Third, Section 14 of the Maine State Constitution says:

Corporations shall be formed under general laws, and shall not be created by special Acts of the Legislature, except for municipal purposes, and in cases where the objects of the corporation cannot otherwise be attained, and, however formed , they shall forever be subject of the general laws of the state ( emphasis mine)

Quote from the legislative Charter for Brunswick Landing Maine's Center for Innovation : The Midcoast Regional Redevelopment Authority is established as a body corporate and politic and a public instrumentality of the State to carry out the purposes of this article. The authority is entrusted with acquiring and managing the properties within the geographic boundaries of Brunswick Naval Air Station. [2009, c. 641,
§1 (AMD).]
1. Powers. The authority is a public municipal corporation and may:D. Exercise the power of eminent domain; [2005, c. 599, §1 (NEW).]


Wednesday, November 25, 2009

The Goverenment and Industry Partnership VS the Motivation for the Non-Profit Organization

A few years ago I read two books:

The Free Agent Nation by Daniel H. Pink

The Non-Profit Economy by Burton Allen Weisbrod

The Free Agent Nation now seems like a relic from our distant past, while the principles in The Non-Profit Economy, which lays out the distinctions and roles that separate the private economy, government, and the non-profit economy, cry for public review.

While I was searching for The Nonprofit Economy, I came upon this paper, which expands upon the work of Weisbrod, published in Munich by Giovanni Cerulli

The redistributive role of non-profit organizations


By starting from the consideration that non-profit organizations cover a significant re-distributive function beside that of governmental agencies, the paper questions why government prefers to finance via transfers private entities likewise lucrative and non-lucrative entities rather than produce these goods directly.

By generalizing the Hansmann (1996) theory, we propose a “make or buy” approach in which the choice among three different ownership regimes (governmental, non-profit and for-profit) providing services in public benefit oriented sectors is affected not only by costs reduction (X-efficiency) but also by the level of transfers (degree of “redistribution”) decided at a political level.


Nonetheless, as suggested by Borzaga (2001), two elements seem to be overlooked by this literature. The first relies on a scarce attention devoted to the internal structure of the non-profit institution that still remains an unexplored black box; the second refers to the fact that this literature has quite completely overlooked the evident fact that non-profit organizations also hold a relevant “redistributive function”, that is, they are set up for and operate with the explicit goal of modifying the distribution of income when the current one is considered as not consistent with social preferences (Borzaga, 2003, p. 39). This aim is particularly distinctive for non-profit organizations working within public benefit oriented sectors where, as we will see, beside the need for efficiency society considers also the need for equity. The paper aims to analyze this second issue by deepening the first one.

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